This paper concentrates on peculiar behaviors of an English word, else, among various lexical items which have to do with the exceptive constructions. Reviewing its intriguing properties, it is argued that a simple way of reducing an "exception" from the domain of quantification and a more enriched domain of quantification, containing at least pairs of individuals, are preferable.
Introduction
Several researchers have recurrently taken up a construction so called an "exceptive construction" at least within the last decade. Among those in the literature are Moltmann (1995 Moltmann ( , 1996 or von Fintel (1993) . Representative examples are the following:
(1) a. Every student except John b. No student but John and Bill c. Except for John and Bill, Mary knows every student. (Moltmann: 1996: 139) A very naïve characterization of this construction may be that the referent of the noun phrase governed by the preposition, except (for), but or other than, is subtracted from the domain of quantification denoted by the quantified noun phrase to which the prepositional phrase attaches. And in this paper I take up an English word, else, which may count as appearing in an exceptive construction. But I observe else has some peculiar properties compared to other exceptive prepositional phrases. I argue for the above naïve view of "exception" is at least correct in the case of else; rather than a more elaborate view on the exceptive construction. Then we see that another property of else necessitates a more enriched domain of discourse, which contains pairs of individuals in addition to ordinary individuals.
2
Moltmann (1995, 1996) Moltmann deals with the exceptive construction most extensively. She observes that an exceptive prepositional phrase with except (for) does not appear with an existentially quantified noun phrase:
(2) a. #Some students but/except John came to the party.
b. #Except for John, Mary knows some students. (Moltmann 1996: 142) Based on this observation, she posits what she calls the Quantifier Constraint, which literally prohibits an exception phrase from being with an existentially quantified noun phrase. In addition to this condition, she also poses two other conditions: the Negative Condition and the Condition of Inclusion. The former states that "the entities which the exception phrase specifies as the exception have to be 'exceptions'; that is, when associated quantifier is positive, the exceptions should not fall under the predicate, and when the associated quantifier is negative, they should fall under the predicate" (Moltmann 1996: 141) . The latter requires that "the exceptions belong to the restriction of the quantifier denoted by the associated NP, i.e. the denotation of the N'" (op. cit.) . In accordance with these conditions, Moltmann analyzes an exception marker except: The first condition is for a positively universal quantifier and the second for a negatively universal quantifier. The third condition does not allow an exception phrase headed by except to appear with an existentially quantified noun phrase, which correctly predicts Moltmann's observation about existentially quantified noun phrases as shown in (2). One thing to note in Moltmann's definition is that her way of analyzing the "exceptions" is rather elaborate. As is easily seen, she divides the exceptions into two cases: a positive one and a negative one. In the case of a positive universal quantifier, the exceptional entities are subtracted from every member of the quantifier denotation. This means that the exceptional entities do not satisfy any predicate which is a member of a universal quantifier to which the exceptional phrase attaches. Thus, the exceptional entities are really "exceptions", satisfying Moltmann's Negative Condition.
On the other hand, in the case of a negative universal quantifier, the exception entities are added to every member of the negative universal quantifier, via set union operation. Therefore the added exceptions satisfy the predicate which is a member of the negative universal quantifier. Again, the exception entities count as really "exceptions".
The main point of Moltmann's Quantifier Constraint is that an existentially quantified noun phrase cannot go with an exception construction. In her definition of except, this is ensured by "for every V -" conditions on both lines. Suppose an existential quantifier is counted as Q in the definition. Among the members of the existential quantifier Q, there may be some predicates which contain the excepfion C as their member; and at the same time there may be some predicates which do not contain C. Then in the case of an existential quantifier, it does not satisfy either of "for every V -" conditions. Thus for such a quantifier, exception is undefined by means of the third line of the definition.
3
Exception with an Existential Quantifier
Basic Observation on else
As surveyed above, Moltmann's definition of except seems to be working well. But I argue in this paper that her definition does not work properly for the exceptive constructions in general. One such case is else, which is the main topic of this paper.
Else shows several peculiar properties. One of them is that quantified noun phrases which can be associated with else are mostly restricted to those expressed by a single word', such as everything or nobody; or wh-words2: (4) a. Everybody else came to the party. I One case is found where else attaches to a noun phrase consisting of more than one word:
(i) In the thy season there is no water else for a man's long journey of a day. e. Friday isn't convenient for me so when else can we meet? f. I know that sounds melodramatic but I don't know how else to put it.
The most salient property of else in comparison with other items appearing in the exceptive constructions is that else normally does not overtly mark the "exception". That is, the "exceptional" entities are not overtly realized'. In all of the above examples, what counts as an "exception" is not marked by else. Let us call the exceptional entities of else the implicit argument of else. Then the implicit argument of else must be recovered from a preceding discourse or a context.
At this point, let us turn to another previous analysis, which considers the possible range of the antecedent of the implicit argument of else: Culicover and Jackendoff (1995)4.
C & J observe that else can take as antecedent the subject of the same clause:
(7) a. John carefully ignores everyone else while doing yoga. b. Frankly, we don't expect anyone else to like this paper, but we're publishing it anyway. (C &J: 253)
Or, it can take a nonlocal antecedent in the sentence:
(8) a. Mary was elected president, and someone else was elected vice president. b. John thought that someone else would win. (op. cit.: 254) Not only an element in a sentence, else can take a deictic element as its antecedent: (9) [As John enters the room:] Oy, can't you find someone else? (ibid.)
A quantified expression can further be an antecedent of else. In this case, the implicit argument of else acts like a bound variable and what is obviated varies according to the quantifier to which it is bound:
(10) a. Everyone (here) loves someone else. Meaning: For all x, there is at least one y such that x*y and x loves y. b. Everyone (here) thinks that someone else will win.
Meaning: For all x, x thinks that there is at least one y such that x*y and y will win.
(ibid.)
C & J observe that else is similar to reflexives in that it finds its antecedent within the minimal clause. And at the same time, they conclude that else is also similar to pronouns, in that it finds its antecedent in some nonlocal position. But at this point, we need much closer investigation. Finding an antecedent in the same clause is incompatible with pronouns:
(11) *John, hates him,. Meaning: John hates himself.
In this respect, else is not similar to pronouns. In the same way, finding an antecedent in some nonlocal position is incompatible with reflexives:
(12) *John, thinks that himself, will win.
In this sense, then, else is not similar to reflexives. What can be concluded is that else is similar to neither reflexives nor pronouns with respect to possible positions of its antecedent. Furthermore, it can be concluded that else never obeys any configurational conditions unlike reflexives or pronouns.5
Something else
In the preceding section, it is surveyed that Moltmann's definition of except does not allow it to attach to an existentially quantified noun phrase. In this subsection, it is shown that her analysis is not applicable to all the cases of the exceptive construction. Namely, some cases are exemplified from a corpus, where else follows an existentially quantified noun phrase. See the following example (previous (8) Although in the case of else, an "exception" is not overtly realized, there must be an implicit argument of else and it must count as an "exception". Even if we suppose that the semantics for the implicit argument of else is in some way developed, we cannot reuse Moltmann's definition of except. This is because her definition makes it undefined when an exception phrase attaches to an existentially quantified noun phrase. The above note also applies to other kinds of exceptive constructions. Adjectival other is one such example. In the same way as except or else, adjectival other can appear in a (positive or negative) universal quantified noun phrase:6 (14) a. For some reason, this ellipsis in the conversation spread until it swallowed up every other topic. b. With capital largely squandered, there seemed to them no other course to pursue.
In addition to the above, other can go with some:
(15) The fear had not entirely gone from her face, but there were some other emotions now,.
More surprising, other can appear even with many:
(16) We believe that autism, like so many other conditions of defect and deviation, is to a large extent inborn.
Thus, it can be concluded that Moltmann's definition of except cannot be extended to the two cases above at least.' Thus we should seek some other view on the exceptions. One candidate is an analysis by von Fintel (1993). Contrary to Moltmann, he does not seek for a elaborate kind of definition for the exceptive constructions. Rather, he states that the exceptive entity denoted by an exception phrase is subtracted from the domain of quantification of the quantifier to which the exception attaches: a more naïve way of analysis. There are no sub-cases for a positive universal quantifier on one hand and a negative universal quantifier on the other hand. Although it is true that von Fintel himself observes that an existential quantifier cannot go with an exception, his way of analysis can be applied to an existential quantifier. Thus I assume that there is basically no restriction on the quantifier which an exception attaches to.
What else?
So far, it is observed that a more naive way of viewing "exceptions" is more preferable in view of the behaviors of else. In this section, I add another peculiar property else exhibits. That is, two instances of else in the same sentence induce pair quantification. See the following example, where two instances of else appear:
(17) --John criticized Bill and nobody else criticized nobody else.
--Listen, though... a) *Nancy criticized Tom, too. b) *John criticized Tom, too. c) *Nancy criticized Bill, too.
(cf. Keenan 1992: 205)8
As observed from the fact that any continuation (a), (b) and (c) is ruled out, the criticize-relation asserted before the second sentence is the only instance of criticize. This meaning can be captured in the line of branching quantifiers, plus assuming that else functions as obviating an entity appearing in the preceding context from the domain of the quantified noun phrase to which else is attached. Thus else can be paraphrased as other than X, X an entity in the preceding context. The above example is represented like this:
(18) -.3x, x a man & x is not John y a man & y is not Bill x criticized y (19) "There was no one such that he is not John and he criticized somebody AND there was no one such that he is not Bill and somebody criticized him."
The intuition is that there was no criticizer except John, that is, John was the only criticizing person; and there was no criticized person other than Bill, that is, only Bill was criticized. Hence, <john, bill> is the only criticize-relation. It appears that this branching quantifier analysis seems to have no problem. But further investigation to the fact shows that this analysis is not satisfactory. Look at the next example:
(21) --John criticized Bill and Sam criticized Harry, but nobody else criticized nobody else.
--In fact,... a) *Nancy criticized Tom, too.
other cases. Although Keenan's original example uses "no one" in place of "nobody", my informant points out me that "no one" is unacceptable and that "nobody" is much more natural. (cf. Keenan 1992: 215) Here, the preceding context before the third sentence specifies two instances of criticize-relation. And the following sentence of our concern disallows any individuals in the preceding context, as well as any new individuals, to stand in a new criticize-relation. Thus, the intuition is that there are only two instances of criticize-relation as specified in the preceding context. If we try to analyze this sentence by means of branching quantifiers, the configuration would be like the following:
x criticized y y a man & y is not Bill & y is not Harry (23) "There was nobody such that he is neither John nor Sam and he criticized somebody AND there was nobody such that he is neither Bill nor Harry and somebody criticized him."
According to (22) and (23), we obtain that John and Sam are the only criticizing people and that Bill and Harry are the only criticized people. This paraphrase seems to be satisfactory. But the problem is that we cannot obtain the exact information of who and who are in criticize-relation. The only information we have is that John and Sam are a subject of the verb and that Bill and Harry are an object of it. Thus, although the paraphrase correctly predicts that there is no criticize-relation defined among individuals who do not appear in the preceding context (relations among those not shaded, including the dotted lines in (24)), it may incorrectly predict more criticize-relations among those shaded individuals (thin lines) in (24), whereas in the example, only <john, bill> and <sam, hany> are asserted (bold lines). Therefore, this paraphrase is unsatisfactory in that it incorrectly allows more relations than the fact. The next example is much more critical to the branching paraphrase:
(25) Mary criticized each student and Sam in turn criticized her, but nobody else criticized nobody else. (Keenan 1992: 215) (26) "There was no one such that he is neither Mary nor Sam and he criticized somebody AND there was no one such that he is neither Sam, nor Mary, nor studentl, nor student2, ... nor studentn and somebody criticized him."
bill harry tom nancy...)
Suppose the boys in (27) are students and Mary and Nancy are teachers. Same as the previous example, the branching paraphrase correctly rules out the relation among the individuals which are not shaded. it, however, incorrectly allows relations with Sam in the first slot and the students in the second slot of a criticize-relation, which are not asserted in the preceding context. Again, a wrong prediction. If we take quantification over pairs, these facts are easily analyzed. The intuition is the following:
(28) THERE IS NO PAIR OTHER THAN THOSE PAIRS ALREADY MENTIONED. Then, the above examples are described like the following (here, only (27) In the above set, the shaded pairs are asserted in the preceding context. Thus, this semantics correctly predicts that those asserted pairs are the only criticize-relations.
5
Toward compositionality
So far, it has been observed that two instances of else may show a peculiar semantic property in a certain context and it has been argued that such a property is best grasped by means of pair quantification, that is, quantification over pairs. But one controversial problem remains, the problem of compositionality.
The source of pair quantifiers for those examples is the subject and the object. They occupy completely different positions and never seem to form one unit at the surface form. Thus, the problem of compositionality arises. It is not at all clear how these two noun phrases are combined to yield a pair quantifier. May (1989) tries to derive a pair quantifier through syntactic operations of Quantifier Raising. It is generally assumed that QR is applied to quantified noun phrases, which maps an S-Structure to a Logical Form (LF) and induces a hierarchical asymmetry between the phrases. Further assumption is that such asymmetry is directly reflected to a semantic interpretation and that it is the source of relative scope interpretation. May (1989) gives up this last assumption and assumes that the scopal dependencies cannot be read off from a syntactic structure (LF) and that they arise in the course of interpreting an LF into a semantic representation. He then introduces a new way of interpreting a Logical Form.
Although May continues to assume that QR applies to quantifiers, it does not induce a hierarchical asymmetry between the quantifiers. This is due to the definition of c-command:
(30) a c-commands 13 =df every maximal projection dominating a dominates 0, and a does not dominate f3. (May 1989: 390) With this definition, raised quantified phrases c-command each other: May defines a new notion of a-sequence which stands for a sequence of mutually c-commanding quantifiers:
(31) a is a a-sequence =df V0i, E 0i c-commands 0; and 0; c-commands Oi. (May 1989: 392) Then May assumes a semantic rule, which applies to a a-sequence only when all the quantifiers which belong to the a-sequence are the same item. This rule combines all the quantifiers into one new quantifier. In view of generalized quantifier theory, an ordinary quantifier is seen as a two-place predicate taking two sets of individuals. If the new rule applies, a new quantifier Q1 ,2 arises which is still a two-place predicate but takes two sets of pairs of individuals, not sets of individuals. This analysis seems attractive also for our problem sentences with else. A remaining problem is how to construct "exception" pairs. For the time being, let us assume some constructional rule, which is sensitive to multiple instances of else and a a-sequence. This rule allows us to invoke "exception" pairs to be subtracted from the quantification domain of the pair quantifier induced by the above rule.
Although a satisfactory analysis of compositionality for the above examples are still to be elaborated, it is to be noted that for the adequate semantic description, assuming only sets of individuals is not enough; and that more structured object is necessary: sets of pairs of individuals at least.9
